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Abstract
The wearing of a headscarf at work is a contested issue in many
European countries and the legal approach towards headscarf bans varies greatly. So
far, the European Court of Human Rights seems to have given its blessing to widely
diverging approaches by granting the national authorities a wide margin of appreci-
ation in regulating this matter. More recently the Court of Justice of the EU was also
confronted with this issue in the cases Achbita and Bougnaoui. However, the resulting
preliminary rulings are formulated in such a terse and minimally motivated way as
to generate confusion rather than provide clear guidance to the member states. This
contribution seeks to explore the space left by the two judgments for further interpre-
tation of the relevant EU standards and to discuss the different ways in which the
CJEU could proceed in future cases, taking also into account the case law of the
Strasbourg Court and the diverging approaches in the member states.
1. Introduction
The wearing of a headscarf at work is a contested issue in
many European countries and the legal approach towards headscarf bans varies
greatly.1 In some countries such bans are seen as an unacceptable limitation of
the freedom of religion and/or a violation of non-discrimination law; in other
countries they are allowed because priority is given to other important interests
or values. Where employment in the public sphere is concerned, the principle
of state neutrality often plays a crucial role in limiting the freedom of workers.2
So far, in its interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) to which all European countries are bound, the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR), seems to have given its blessing to both approaches
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The United Kingdom and France seem to represent two opposite models in this respect, with
the UK providing employees far more liberty to wear religious dress or symbols at work than
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workers in France, in particular where public sector employment is concerned. Other countries
such as Germany and the Netherlands are somewhere in between these two models. See for
an overview H. van Ooijen, Religious Symbols in Public Functions: Unveiling State Neutrality. A
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at the same time by granting the national authorities a wide margin of appreci-
ation in regulating this matter.
More recently the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) was also confronted
with this issue in the cases Achbita and Bougnaoui.3 In these cases it was called
upon to decide whether EU Directive 2000/78, which prohibits discrimination
on grounds of religion in employment, should be interpreted to allow for a
headscarf ban in the workplace of a private enterprise.4 However, the resulting
preliminary rulings are formulated in such a terse and minimally motivated
way as to generate confusion rather than provide clear guidance to the member
states. In this respect, this contribution takes issue with the first reaction to the
judgments in the media, concluding that the CJEU gives employers a more or
less free hand to prohibit headscarves in the workplace.5 This conclusion is too
quick and up for discussion.
Remarkably the core reasoning of each of the rulings does not consist of
much more than a single page. This is all the more surprising as the Court
could have drawn from two elaborate opinions of the Advocates General Kokott
and Sharpston.6 This terseness and lack of clarity may very well be explained
by a serious and profound disagreement within the Court on the proper inter-
pretation of the applicable EU law regarding this issue. Given the widely diver-
ging opinions of the Advocate Generals in both cases and the equally widely
diverging approaches in the member states, this would not be surprising.7 In
such circumstances minimalism and ambiguity in the judgment provide a way
to arrive at some sort of consensus that can be supported by a majority. In ad-
dition they provide the opportunity to revisit the issue in future cases – which
will no doubt reach the Court – with sufficient flexibility to further develop the
case law as the Court sees fit.
If this reading of the judgment is correct it implies two important points.
First of all it implies that the outcome of the judgments is to be approached as
an intermediate phase, as a first step towards the development of a fuller and
clearer interpretative framework for addressing the regulation of religious
Comparative Analysis of Dutch, English and French Justifications for Limiting the Freedom of Public
Officials to Display Religious Symbols, Intersentia: Antwerpen 2012.
CJEU (Grand Chamber) 14 March 2017, C-157/15 (Achbita v. G4S); CJEU (Grand Chamber)
14 March 2017, C-188/15 (Bougnaoui and ADDH v. Micropole).
3
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation, OJ L303/16 (Framework directive).
4
See. e.g. the Guardian, www.theguardian.com/law/2017/mar/14/employers-can-ban-staff-from-




(last accessed 2 October 2017).
Opinion AG Kokott of 31 May 2016 in case C-157/15 (Achbita); Opinion AG Sharpston of 13 July
2016 in case C-188/15 (Bougnaoui).
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clothing or symbols in the workplace under EU law rather than providing def-
inite and clear guidance to the member states. Secondly, this reading implies
that the judgments probably leave quite some room for further legal development
and interpretation of the applicable EU law. As a consequence, it is important
to take a closer look at them to analyze this scope for further interpretation
under EU law in more detail, also taking into account the case law of the ECtHR
and the diverging approaches in the member states.
This contribution seeks to do just that. It will start by briefly discussing the
approaches to the wearing of religious dress or symbols in the workplace in
three countries that can be seen as representative of the widely diverging views
within the EU on this issue: the UK, France and the Netherlands (section 2).
As will become clear below, the UK represents one end of the spectrum by
taking a very accommodating approach to workers who wish to wear religious
dress or symbols, giving priority to their freedom to do so both in the public
and the private sector. France is representative of the other side of the spectrum
by banning the wearing of all religious dress and symbols from the entire
public and related sector. The Netherlands is somewhere in between these two
approaches. After exploring the most relevant case law of the ECtHR regarding
religious dress and symbols (section 3) this contribution will continue with a
detailed analysis of the preliminary rulings of the CJEU in the cases Achbita
and Bougnaoui (section 4). Section 5 will discuss the different ways in which
the CJEU could proceed in future cases including the main reasons for and
against going each of these ways. The final section will draw some overall con-
clusions.
2. Diverging approaches to religious dress in the
workplace: the UK, France and the Netherlands
Within Europe widely diverging practices and policies exist
regarding the wearing of religious dress or symbols in the workplace. In partic-
ular, where employment in the public sphere is at stake the differences stand
out; differences regarding the private sector are often less apparent or pro-
nounced. The following overview of legal approaches in France, the UK and
the Netherlands regarding wearing religious dress or symbols in public and
private employment is very illustrative of European diversity on this matter.
2.1. Religious dress in the public sector
In the public sector diverging approaches to the wearing of
religious dress or symbols at work are heavily influenced if not determined by
diverging conceptions of the principle of state neutrality. To understand why
this is the case it is useful to first devote a few words to this principle.
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2.1.1. State neutrality
The notion of state neutrality is part of liberal democracy and
has its roots in the liberal notion that every person should be free to decide
about what constitutes ‘the good life’ for himself or herself and to pursue it
during his or her lifetime. The state should respect this fundamental liberty
and be careful not to impose a particular vision of the good life on its citizens;
it should be neutral. Being a major element of people’s perception of the good
life, state neutrality must include neutrality regarding religion and belief.8
Generally speaking state neutrality in respect of religion entails several
things.9 First of all, state neutrality calls for institutional separation of church
and state so as to guarantee their mutual independence. Secondly, state neutral-
ity requires the state not to evaluate, favour or disfavour religions or beliefs, be
it in general or in its interaction with individuals and communities. This means
the state should not pronounce itself on whether something constitutes a religion
or belief and it should not give preferential treatment to one religion over an-
other. Thirdly, the state should not impose religion or belief by either forcing
or prohibiting individuals to adhere to a particular religion or by proselytism
or indoctrination in favour of a particular religion. Fourthly, state neutrality
means that the state should not favour or disfavour individuals or communities
on the basis of their religion or belief in their direct contact with these individu-
als, or put simply, the state should not treat persons differentially on grounds
of religion or belief.
Whereas the above features and requirements of the principle of state neu-
trality seem to be broadly accepted, the way to achieve such state neutrality is
not. In fact, in the academic literature two distinct and opposite approaches to
achieving state neutrality are distinguished: exclusive and inclusive neutrality.10
On the one hand, exclusive neutrality seeks to achieve state neutrality by being
‘religion blind’, that is by completely ignoring religious identities and differences
and by requiring the state not to express any affiliation with religion. As a con-
sequence, religious expressions are to be banned from the public sphere. In-
clusive neutrality, on the other hand, seeks to achieve state neutrality by recog-
nition of religious identities and diversity. It takes a different view on what is
neutral. Banning religious expressions from the public sphere is perceived as
not being neutral because of the negative impact this entails for religious people.
For a fuller discussion see H. van Ooijen, Religious symbols in public functions. A comparative
analysis of Dutch, English and French justifications for limiting the freedom of public officials to display
religious symbols (dissertation Leiden University, Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2012).
8
The following overview is also based on Van Ooijen, supra note 8, Chapter 4.9
The terminology seems to have been coined by W. van den Burg, but the models they represent
are common throughout the literature on state neutrality. W. van der Burg, Inclusive Neutral-
10
ity in the Classroom, Yearbook of the European Association for Education Law and Policy, 2011.
Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1907594.
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The implication here being that religious expressions in the public sphere
should be allowed. A crucial condition for the state still being regarded as
neutral then turns on equality and equal treatment: all religions should be
equally allowed to be visible and present. The state cannot be selective. So in
fact neutrality is achieved through inclusion and accommodation of all religions
in the public sphere on an equal basis.
To conclude, state neutrality is not a straightforward notion at all. This can
be illustrated by the diverging approaches to the wearing of religious dress or
symbols in France, the UK and the Netherlands.
2.1.2. France, the UK and the Netherlands
France generally adheres to a very specific, strict and ‘exclusive’
conception of state neutrality which is encapsulated in the principle of laï-
cité.11 This principle requires all public servants in whatever function or job to
abstain from donning any religious dress or symbols in the workplace.12 Reli-
gious expressions are deemed to belong to the private sphere and are to be ex-
cluded from the state sphere. Public servants are seen as representatives of the
state and as such should always appear to be strictly neutral and leave their re-
ligious identity behind when at work.
This very strict version of state neutrality is perceived as a cornerstone of
the French state. It is closely connected to both the institutional separation of
Church and State and the French republican ideal of citizenship. The French
approach combines full recognition of the freedom to express religious personal
identity and diversity in the private sphere with a requirement of equal and
neutral citizenship in the state sphere. Because neutral citizenship is all impor-
tant, neutrality in public education is also of central concern as it plays a crucial
role in developing this citizenship ideal across the nation.
The strictness of the French approach is borne out by the fact that the ban
on religious dress or symbols applies irrespective of the public official concerned
being in visible contact with the general public. Also illustrative is the inclusion
of pupils in the public school system: pupils in primary and secondary education
For an elaboration of the concept of laïcité and its consequences as described in this brief
overview see the report by the Commission that advised the French Government on the intro-
11
duction of a ban on religious symbols in public education, Commission de réflexion sur l’ap-
plication du principe de laïcité dans la République, Rapport au président de la République et au
parlement, 11 décembre 2003, www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/044000099-
rapport-2003-au-president-de-la-republique-et-au-parlement (last accessed 29 September 2017).
It covers people working in core state functions such as the judiciary and the police, but also
public school teachers, administrative personnel at ministries or other public institutions and
cleaning personnel employed by the state.
12
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are equally subject to the rules as teachers.13 Last but not least the laïcité principle
is also applicable to private companies providing public services, thus extending
the prohibition to wear religious dress or symbols at work far beyond strictly
public employment relationships.
The approach in the UK lies on the other end of the scale. The UK clearly
adheres to an inclusive model of state neutrality by putting the freedom of
public officials to express their religion first.14 Almost no restrictions on the
wearing of religious dress or symbols are deemed acceptable. Exceptions
primarily regard functional justifications for restrictions. Thus, for example,
the wearing of face covering veils may be prohibited for reasons of communi-
cation.15 In this respect it is important to note that not just ordinary public ser-
vants or public school teachers are allowed to wear a headscarf or turban at
work, but also police officers and judges. In fact, 2003 saw the first Sikh judge
sitting on the High Court, turban and all.16 All this is not to say no public debate
exists on such issues, but overall the legal approach is very accommodationist.17
The Dutch approach is somewhere in between France and the UK. It follows
primarily an inclusionary model, but not all over the board.18 For the far majority
of public servants, including public school teachers, Dutch practice is similar
to the UK. They are free to wear a headscarf or other religious dress or symbols
at work. Exceptions to this freedom can only be based on functional require-
ments such as safety, hygiene or communication. The latter is also considered
to provide a justification for banning face covering veils.19
In response to diverging practices in French schools a legal ban on the wearing of religious
symbols in primary and secondary public schools was adopted in 2004, Loi n° 2004-228 du
13
15 mars 2004 encadrant, en application du principe de laïcité, le port de signes ou de tenues manifestant
une appartenance religieuse dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics. www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affich-
Texte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000417977&categorieLien=id (last accessed 29 September
2017).
An anomaly to state neutrality in the UK being the still privileged position of the Anglican
church in the institutional arrangements. In practice, however, this position should not be
14
overestimated as the UK has considerably moved towards becoming a secular state in practice.
See P.W. Edge, Secularism and establishment in the United Kingdom, in: P. Cumper and
T. Lewis (eds), Religion, rights and secular society. European perspectives, Elgar: Cheltenham 2012,
p. 38-57.
See Employment Appeal tribunal 30 March 2007, Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough
Council ,[2007] I.C.R. 1154. In this case a primary school teacher was dismissed because her
15
niqab interfered with proper communication with her pupils. Her appeal against this dismissal
was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
See ‘High court judge will be first to wear turban’, www.guardi-
an.co.uk/uk/2003/mar/24/race.world (last accessed 29 September 2017).
16
See for some of the discussions McGoldrick, The headscarf debate in Europe, supra note 1,
Chapter 6.
17
See for a fuller picture M. van den Brink and T. Loenen, The Netherlands: neutral but not in-
different, in P. Cumper and T. Lewis (eds), Religion, rights and secular society. European perspec-
tives, Elgar: Cheltenham 2012, p. 17-37.
18
In fact a formal legal prohibition of face covering clothing in education, public transport,
public buildings and healthcare is pending with the Senate, see Wetsvoorstel gedeeltelijk verbod
19
gezichtsbedekkende kleding (Kamerstukken II, 2015-2016, no. 34 349), https://zoek.officielebek-
endmakingen.nl/dossier/34349.
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For a few distinct categories of public officials, the policy is more in line
with the French approach. These categories concern public servants who are
involved in core state functions. Thus for the judiciary strict rules apply which
do not allow for the wearing of any religious attire in the court room.20 The
same applies to other expressions of personal belief or identity, such as, for
instance, a pink triangle or political symbols. As such, the policy is not singling
out religious expressions, but seeks to achieve a more overall outwardly neutral
appearance.
For the police similar restrictions apply, though the policy regarding this
category of public servants is not firmly settled it seems. Some twenty years
ago plans were developed to design matching headscarves with police uniforms,
but before this was realized the mood changed and after quite some debates
the police settled for a more restrictive policy of ‘life style neutrality’.21 This
policy does not allow for the wearing of religious dress or symbols during work
and more generally prohibits visible expressions of religious, political and per-
sonal convictions or identity, including conspicuous tattoos, haircuts and pier-
cings. The Dutch national institute for human rights, the College voor de Rechten
van de Mens, issued a critical advice regarding the policy because of its potentially
discriminatory impact on specific religious groups such as Muslim women.
The College in particular takes issue with the policy being applicable to all police
personnel without distinguishing between those who are in touch with the
general public and those who are not.22 In May 2017 a proposal by the head of
police in Amsterdam to change this policy and allow Muslim police officers to
wear a headscarf while on duty met with fierce reactions on social media,
showing the continuing controversy surrounding this issue. The national head
of police subsequently decided not to pursue this idea any further.23
This brief sample of approaches to the wearing of religious dress or symbols
in public functions shows how widely different approaches exist across European
countries, reflecting diverging conceptions of state neutrality as either exclusive
or inclusive neutrality.
This prohibition is not based on a specific legislative provision, but on the application of the
dress codes formulated for the judiciary.
20
For a discussion of the backgrounds to this change see S. Saharso and D. Lettinga, ‘Contentious
Citizenship: Policies and Debates on theVeil in the Netherlands’, Social Politics, vol. 15, 2009,
p. 455-480.
21
Advies 2007/08 inzake uiterlijke verschijningsvormen politie ‘Pluriform uniform?’ (Advice 2007/08




voor-dit-idee~a4497127/ (last accessed 2 October 2017).
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2.2. Religious dress in the private sector
As far as private sector employment is concerned differences
between the three countries are less stark. Approaches in the UK and the
Netherlands are quite similar indeed. The freedom of workers to wear religious
dress or symbols is the default position. Any limitations have to be justified
and are only acceptable when functionally necessary, that is for reasons of safety,
hygiene or other functional reasons.24
The situation in France is less clear and does not seem to be fully crystallized,
but nevertheless the approach to wearing religious clothing or other symbols
is definitely not as strict as in the public sector; the private sector not being
ruled by the constitutional value of laïcité. As it is put explicitly in the ministerial
guide on religious matters in employment, the State is ‘laïque’; whereas the
civil society is governed by the freedom of religion and private enterprises and
not under an obligation of neutrality.25 Accordingly, also in France and in the
private sector a prohibition of wearing a headscarf or other religious clothing
or symbol requires a functional justification and must be proportionate to the
aim pursued.26 In its application, however, justifications are more easily accepted
than in the UK or the Netherlands, as can be illustrated by the Baby-Loup case.27
In this case the French Court of Cassation held that a day care center could re-
quire an employee to refrain from wearing a headscarf because of its policy of
neutrality towards children and parents. Interestingly this ruling was rendered
by the plenary Court, overruling a decision by its Social Chamber in favour of
the employee.28 If anything, this shows that the acceptability of a neutrality
policy by a private employer is indeed not self-evident. The ministerial guide
concerning religious matters in employment also points this out. It provides a
lot of examples of decisions handed down by the courts regarding headscarves
I leave aside here the position of religious institutions – for example the Catholic or Anglican
Church – as well as other organizations based on a religious ethos, such as denominational
24
schools or the Salvation Army. Such organisations can claim exceptions to this strict approach
to protect their specific identity as is provided for in article 4(2) of Directive 2000/78.
‘…c’est la République c’est à dire l’État, qui est laïque, tandis que la société civile reste gouvernée
par la liberté de religion’ and ‘…l’entreprise privée n’est pas tenue à une obligation de neutralité’.
25
See Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la Formation professionelle et du Dialogue Social,
Guide pratique du fait religieux dans les entreprises privees, Janvier 2017, http://travail-em-
ploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/guide_employeurs_valide.pdf (last accessed 22 September 2017).
Ibid., p. 7-8.26
Cour de cassation – Assemblée Plénière, Arrêt n° 612 du 25 juin 2014 (13-28.369);
ECLI:FR:CCASS:2014:AP00612.
27
For an overview of the various proceedings in the case see F. Johannès, Baby Loup: épilogue
et décision de la Cour de cassation, 27 June 2014,
28
http://libertes.blog.lemonde.fr/2014/06/27/baby-loup-epilogue-et-decision-de-la-cour-de-cas-
sation/ (last accessed 1 October 2017).
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and other religious expressions in employment and points out that the jurispru-
dence is not yet fully set.29
However diverging the above practices are, so far the European Court of
Human Rights seems to consider all of them compatible with the rights en-
shrined in the ECHR as can be inferred from the following overview of its case
law.
3. The case law of the Strasbourg Court on religious
dress in the workplace
3.1. Religious dress in the public sector
The case law of the ECtHR so far largely concerns religious
dress or symbols in the public sphere. The Court’s line of jurisprudence started
with Dahlab v. Switzerland.30 Though this was an admissibility decision, it set
the stage by accepting the argument of state neutrality as justification for the
dismissal of a public school teacher who started to wear a headscarf in the class
room. In subsequent cases the Court elaborated its approach and held time and
again that the states parties to the Convention enjoy a wide margin of appreci-
ation in regulating this type of issue. Several landmark cases merit attention
in this respect.
The first Grand Chamber judgment on the regulation of religious clothing
and symbols in the public sphere was rendered in the case of Sahin v. Turkey.31
It concerned a complaint by a student at a Turkish state university regarding a
ban on wearing religious dress or symbols, which was applicable to both per-
sonnel and pupils. The main argument for the ban was the principle of state
neutrality that has its roots in the foundation of the Turkish Republic and is
constitutionally guaranteed. The Court upheld the Turkish ban and considered
that it did not violate the freedom of religion as enshrined in the ECHR. In its
reasoning the Court gave pride of place to the margin of appreciation to be left
to the national authorities in this matter. It emphasized that ‘where questions
concerning the relationship between State and religions are concerned, on
which opinion in a democratic society may reasonably differ widely, the role of
the national decision-making body must be given special importance’.32 As a
consequence it left a wide margin of appreciation to the Turkish authorities to
Guide pratique du fait religieux dans les entreprises privees, supra note 25, p. 15.29
ECtHR 15 February 2001, Dahlab v. Switzerland (decision on admissibility), appl.nr. 42393/98.30
ECtHR 10 November 2005 (Grand Chamber), Sahin v. Turkey, appl.no. 44774/98.31
Sahin, supra note 31, para. 109.32
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decide whether it is indeed ‘necessary’ to ban the wearing of all religious
clothing and symbols in public education. The Court then accepted the argu-
ments put forward by the Turkish Government, in particular those referring
to the specific constitutional value attached to the principle of state neutrality
and the strong political significance attached to the wearing of a headscarf
within the context of the growing influence of extremist political movements
in the country. According to dissenting judge Tulkens, the margin of appreci-
ation awarded to the state in this case is so wide as to make her conclude that
‘European supervision seems quite simply to be absent from the judgment’.33
In the meantime, after widely publicized debates on the issue, France had
adopted legislation prohibiting the wearing of religious dress and symbols
throughout primary and secondary public education in 2004.34 Given the con-
troversies surrounding this ban, a complaint by affected pupils was bound to
reach the Strasbourg Court sooner or later. An important question the Court
would have to answer concerned the different contexts of the ban, which in
France mainly affects minority religions. Would this difference in context lead
to a different outcome if compared to the Sahin judgment? In 2009 the Court
had the opportunity to rule on this issue in response to complaints by both
Muslim and Sikh pupils.35 Again the Court accepted the argument of state
neutrality without much further scrutiny by reiterating the wide margin of ap-
preciation the national authorities enjoy in regulating such issues. It held the
complaints to be manifestly ill-founded and thus inadmissible.36
Another Grand Chamber judgment worth mentioning is Lautsi v. Italy even
if it is not about the freedom of an individual person to express his or her religion
through dress or symbols in view of the principle of state neutrality, but rather
about the freedom of the state to hang crucifixes in the public school classroom
in relation to that principle. It is nevertheless an important case for the topic
of this contribution as the Court reaffirms it will take a very deferential approach
Sahin supra note 31, dissenting opinion Tulkens. The wide margin of appreciation is also
pointed out in academic comments on the case, see .e.g. T. Lewis, What not to wear: religious
33
rights, the European Court and the margin of appreciation, International and Comparative Law
Quarterly vol. 56, 2007, p. 395-414.
Loi n° 2004-228, supra note 12. For the background and developments leading up to this ban
see McGoldrick, supra note 1, Chapter 2: The Islamic headscarf debate in France.
34
The cases were all decided on the same day, ECrtHR 30 June 2009; on Muslim women’s
complaints: Aktas v. France, appl. no. 43563/08; Bayrak v. France, appl.no. 14308/08; Gamaleddyn
35
v. France, appl.no. 18527/08; Ghazal v. France, appl.no. 29134/08; on complaints by Sikh pupils:
Javir Singh v. France, appl.no. 25463/08; Ranjit Singh v. France, appl.no. 27561/08.
Interestingly the Human Rights Committee, the supervisory body to the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights came to a different outcome in a similar case, see HRC 1 November
36
2012, Bikramjit Singh v. France, comm.no. 1852/2008; CCPR/C/106/D/1852/2008. Article 18
ICCPR, which protects the freedom of religion, is very similar to art. 9 ECH in its wording,
but contrary to the ECtHR the HRC is more strict in its assessment of the proportionality of
the measure. To sacrifice the pupil’s rights is not considered necessary and in fact dispropor-
tionate (para. 8.7).
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to how national authorities regulate religious dress or symbols in the public
sphere more generally.
Interestingly, in the initial Chamber judgment the Court unanimously
concluded that the Italian practice constituted an infringement of the Conven-
tion.37 It held that the State must refrain from imposing beliefs, even indirectly,
in places where persons are dependent on it or in places where they are partic-
ularly vulnerable, as in school. The State has a duty to uphold confessional
neutrality in public education. The Chamber judgment did not accept the
Italian argument that hanging a crucifix in the class room should be seen
primarily as a historical tradition rather than as a sign of preference for a par-
ticular religion. According to the judgment, the compulsory and highly visible
presence of crucifixes in classrooms is capable of conflicting with the convictions
of pupils of non-Christian religions or those who profess no religion and can
be emotionally disturbing for them.
After referral to the Grand Chamber, however, the Court came to the opposite
conclusion by holding that Italy did not violate the ECHR.38 Though the Court
acknowledges that a crucifix is primarily a religious symbol, it does not consider
it unacceptable for Italy to have crucifixes present in every public school
classroom. Once more the wide margin of appreciation that must be left to the
state is determinate. As long as its practice does not amount to indoctrination,
the state does not overstep this margin of appreciation. As the Court puts it:
‘The State is forbidden to pursue an aim of indoctrination that might be con-
sidered as not respecting parents' religious and philosophical convictions. That
is the limit that the States must not exceed…’.39 According to the Court indoc-
trination is not at issue here as hanging a crucifix on the wall is mainly a
‘passive’ symbol that cannot exert so much influence as to amount to indoctrin-
ation.
Both the Chamber and Grand Chamber judgments were highly publicized
and hotly debated in the media. The different outcome of the two judgments
is striking, especially in view of the fact that the Chamber judgment was unan-
imous and the Grand Chamber ruling almost unanimous. In academia the
shift to a much more deferential position by the Court is often explained by
reference to the sensitivity of the topic and the political context prevalent at the
time, characterized by increasing discussions on the position of the court and
by challenges to its authority to ‘tell states what to do’.40
Whatever the case may be, the Lautsi judgment definitely sets a wide margin
of appreciation for states to regulate this type of issue, showing the Court is
ECtHR 3 November 2009 (Second Section), Lautsi v. Italy, appl.no. 30814/06.37
ECtHR 18 March 2011 (Grand Chamber), Lautsi v. Italy, appl.no. 30814/06.38
Ibid., para. 62.39
See for some of these reactions the ECHRBlog, http://echrblog.blogspot.nl/2011/03/grand-
chamber-judgment-in-lautsi-no.html (last accessed 30 September 2017).
40
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very hesitant to interfere in this controversial matter. It is important to note
that the wide margin of appreciation allows for diverging approaches: both a
strict neutrality approach and showing state affiliation with a particular religion
are acceptable under the ECHR, as long as the latter does not result in prosely-
tizing or indoctrination.
The jurisprudential lines set out in Sahin and in Lautsi were confirmed in
two other cases that are relevant to discuss briefly here. The case of Ebrahimian
v. France is of particular relevance because it deals with a civil servant not em-
ployed in a core state function.41 Ebrahimian was a social worker in a psychiatric
public hospital. Her contract was not renewed because she refused to remove
her headscarf at work. The Court held that France’s general ban on the wearing
of ostentatious religious symbols such as a headscarf is allowed as it seeks to
protect the rights of others, that is the freedom of religion of the users of a
public service. It accepted the abstract and general character of the French jus-
tification for the ban and did not require a more rigid and specific assessment
of why the wearing of a headscarf by a social worker in the position of Ebrahimi-
an poses a threat to the freedom of religion of others.42 The Court explicitly af-
firmed that a strict approach to state neutrality as laid down in the French
constitution does not violate the ECHR and reiterated that the national author-
ities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation in this area.43
To complete this picture of the most relevant case law of the ECtHR about
religious dress in the public sphere the S.A.S. judgment merits attention.44
This Grand Chamber judgment dealt with the French legal ban – introduced
in 2010 – on the wearing of face covering veils such as a niqab or burqa in the
public sphere. According to this general and overall ban it is prohibited for
anyone to conceal their face in any public place anywhere in France, including
on the public road. In assessing the question whether the ban violates article
9 of the ECHR the Court considered the legitimacy of several goals put forward
by the French Government. The Court did not accept the argument of the
French Government that the ban serves to uphold human dignity or gender
equality. The Court considered that women may well freely choose to wear a
face covering veil, as is the case with the complainant. The aim of public safety
was accepted as a legitimate goal, but it could not save the ban because the
Court considered its overall and general nature a disproportional means to
achieve this aim. The goal that ultimately withstood the Court’s test is the goal
of setting minimum requirements for open and interpersonal relationships
which form an indispensable element of community life and for ‘living together’:
ECtHR 26 November 2015, Ebrahimian v. France, appl.no. 6446/11, available in French only.41
This is in fact part of the critique of the dissenting judges in the case, see ibid.42
Ebrahimian, supra note 41, para. 65-67; Referring to its judgment in Sahin, supra note 31. The
Court speaks of ‘une ample marge d’appreciation’ (para. 65).
43
ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 1 July 2014, S.A.S v. France, appl.no. 43835/11.44
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‘The Court is therefore able to accept that the barrier raised against others by
a veil concealing the face is perceived by the respondent State as breaching the
right of others to live in a space of socialization which makes living together
easier.’45
When answering the question whether a ban stretching as far as all public
places is proportionate to achieve this legitimate aim the Court again refers to
the wide margin of appreciation states enjoy regarding this subject matter and
the need to respect the democratic process that led to the ban. It concludes that
‘having regard in particular to the breadth of the margin of appreciation afforded
to the respondent State in the present case, the Court finds that the ban imposed
by the Law of 11 October 2010 can be regarded as proportionate’.46
3.2. Religious dress in the private sector
Whereas the case law of the Court on regulating religious
dress or symbols in the public sphere is quite extensive as the above overview
shows, very limited case law is available addressing the private sector. The
landmark case here is Eweida and others v. UK, dating from 2013.47 The judgment
covers four joined cases, but for the purposes of this contribution the one of
main interest is the case of Eweida as it concerns a private company dress code.
In this case, the Court also leaves a wide margin of appreciation to the national
authorities to regulate this matter. Being the type of case most comparable to
the cases dealt with by the CJEU so far, the Eweida judgment merits some more
detailed attention before we turn to the Luxembourg rulings.
Ms. Eweida worked as a stewardess with British Airways (BA). She was
suspended from her job after she refused to refrain from wearing a small cross
expressing her religious conviction on top of her uniform. The wearing of the
cross was against the dress code. Though the dress code allowed for the wearing
of religious clothing or symbols such as a headscarf or turban, it did not allow
for religious symbols that could be hidden and worn below the uniform. After
a period of consultation and substantial debate, including in the public media,
BA adjusted its policy. Eweida was reinstated in her former job and allowed to
visibly wear her cross on top of her uniform. However, as she did not receive
compensation for the salary she lost during the suspension period she brought
a claim against this decision under national legislation prohibiting discrimina-
Ibid., para. 122.45
Ibid., para. 157. A similar Belgium ban on face covering attire was also upheld more recently
referring to the S.A.S judgment and following similar reasoning, see ECtHR 11 July 2017,
Belkacemi and Oussar v. Belgium (appl.no. 37798/13) and Dakir v. Belgium (appl.no. 4619/12) .
46
ECtHR 15 January 2013, Eweida a.o v. UK (appl.no. 48420/10, 59842/10, 51671/10 and 36516/10).47
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tion on grounds of religion in employment.48 When this claim was denied she
brought her case to the Strasbourg Court. Interestingly, the non-discrimination
legislation on which the national decision was based seeks to implement EU
directive 2000/78 covering, among others, discrimination on grounds of religion
and belief in employment. It is the same directive being central to the prelimi-
nary rulings of the CJEU to be explored below.49
In Strasbourg Eweida claims that the outcome of the procedure violates ar-
ticle 9 ECHR. As the case regards at bottom a horizontal relationship and the
State is only indirectly engaged, the Court’s assessment focuses on the positive
obligations of the state to protect Eweida’s freedom of religion. The applicable
principles, however, are quite comparable, as ‘[i]n both contexts regard must
be had in particular to the fair balance that has to be struck between the com-
peting interests of the individual and of the community as a whole, subject in
any event to the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State’.50
First of all, the Court accepts that national anti-discrimination law can also
provide a proper way of protecting the freedom of religion as it provides for a
thorough assessment of Eweida’s claim.51 Nevertheless, when assessing
whether a fair balance has been struck between the competing interests of
Eweida and her employer the Court concludes this has not been the case. Two
elements in this assessment merit particular attention. Firstly, the Court in very
general terms considers the wish of the employer to project ‘a certain corporate
image’ as ‘undoubtedly legitimate’ without further reflection on the question
whether this would indeed hold for any corporate image.52
Secondly, the Court’s reasons for concluding that the employer’s interests
in this respect have been given too much weight are interesting. The Court
points to the discrete character of the cross worn by Eweida, which as such
‘cannot have detracted from her professional appearance’.53 The Court adds
there is no evidence that wearing other religious dress or symbols by other
employees which were allowed under the dress code, such as headscarves,
turbans and hijabs, has had any negative impact on the corporate image of
BA.
54
A contrario this reasoning could suggest that the balance could be tipped
if particular religious attire is more conspicuous or if it indeed negatively affects
the image of the company. A final reason the Court mentions refers to the ad-
See for a brief overview Eweida, supra note 47, para. 9-17.48
Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for
equal treatment in employment and occupation (Framework directive); see Eweida, supra note
47, para. 43.
49
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 84.50
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 92.51
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 94.52
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 94.53
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 94.54
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justment of the dress code to allow for the wearing of a visible cross, which
shows ‘that the earlier prohibition was not of crucial importance’.55
An important question seems to be whether the Court leaves states in the
private sphere a similarly wide margin of appreciation to balance the rights and
freedoms at stake as in the public sphere. Though the outcome of its judgment
in Eweida would seem to suggest the margin is narrower where the private
sector is concerned, I would say that the specific and rather a-typical facts of
the case do not warrant such a conclusion.56 Indeed, the fact that BA at first
allowed turbans and headscarves with the uniform, yet did not allow for a cross
to be visibly worn, does not make much sense from the perspective of simple
consistency. By not condoning arbitrariness of this kind the Court does not
show it departs from the wide margin of appreciation it grants states in regulat-
ing manifestations of religion.
All in all, the picture appearing from the case law above shows how a wide
margin of appreciation is central to the Court’s approach to limitations on the
wearing of religious clothing or symbols. It also shows that in this area so far
the Court gives its blessing to widely diverging levels of fundamental rights
protection across Europe. It has not stepped in to provide for a more uniform
approach towards the banning of religious dress or symbols in the public or
private sphere. By granting the national authorities an almost free hand the
Court accepts that freedom of religion means quite a different thing depending
on where you live in Europe. The question is whether the CJEU will follow the
same path, a question to which I now turn.
4. The case law of the Luxembourg court on religious
dress in the workplace
4.1. Facts of the cases Achbita and Bougnaoui and the EU legal
framework
Achbita was a receptionist working for a private company,
G4S, which provided reception and other services for customers in both the
public and the private sector. After several years she decided to start wearing a
headscarf at work for religious reasons. Her employer did not allow this because
of the dress code he wished to uphold. To provide a neutral image of the com-
Eweida, supra note 47, para. 94.55
In this respect I do not agree with Eva Brems, who suggests Achbita should turn to the Stras-
bourg Court as having regard to the judgment in Eweida she will probably receive a more fa-
56
vourable outcome there. E. Brems, Analysis: European Court of Justice Allows Bans on Religious
Dress in the Workplace, 25 March 2017. https://iacl-aidc-blog.org/2017/03/25/analysis-european-
court-of-justice-allows-bans-on-religious-dress-in-the-workplace/ (last accessed 1 October 2017).
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pany this dress code prohibited employees from wearing visible signs of their
political, philosophical or religious beliefs in the workplace. As Achbita persisted
in her wish to wear her headscarf at work she was dismissed. In the national
proceedings the Belgian Court asked the CJEU to clarify the meaning of Directive
2000/78, in particular whether the prohibition on wearing an Islamic headscarf
arising from a general internal company rule such as at issue constitutes direct
discrimination on grounds of religion or belief.
The facts in the case Bougnaoui were similar. Bougnaoui was an IT engineer
working for a private company, Micropole, which provides services to all sorts
of clients. She was also dismissed because she refused to refrain from wearing
her headscarf at work when her employer asked her to do so. Contrary to
Achbita, however, the reason why her employer did not agree with her wearing
a headscarf was somewhat different. When Bougnaoui was hired she was already
wearing a headscarf. Her employer did not object to that as such, but had warned
her that it would not always be possible to do so if it would pose problems for
the customers she had to work for. In fact, her dismissal was triggered when
at some point a customer complained about her wearing a headscarf and Micro-
pole asked her to comply with this. In the national proceedings following her
dismissal the French court also asked the CJEU to elucidate the interpretation
of Directive 2000/78, in particular whether the wish of a customer who objects
to having services provided by a worker wearing an Islamic headscarf may be
considered a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ within the
meaning of the Directive.
The preliminary rulings of the CJEU in the cases Achbita and Bougnaoui
are the first ones concerning discrimination on the grounds of religion in em-
ployment. Both cases turn on the interpretation of Directive 2000/78.57 This
directive prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination on grounds of, among
others, religion or belief.58 In the context of EU law distinguishing between direct
and indirect discrimination is highly relevant as the room for justifications re-
garding the former are much more restricted than regarding the latter.59 Direct
discrimination is at stake if an unfavourable treatment is directly based on a
prohibited ground of discrimination, whereas indirect discrimination may occur
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights does not play any role in the judgments of the CJEU
though the Charter also contains provisions regarding freedom of religion (art. 10) and non-
57
discrimination (art. 21). The legal framework applicable to the cases is determined by the much
more detailed elaboration of the legal standards in the Directive.
Other grounds covered are disability, sexual orientation, and age. Separate directives exist re-
garding discrimination on grounds of sex and race or ethnic origin, which have a much wider
scope than employment.
58
For an extensive overview of the directives and the case law of the Court of Justice of the EU
see E.Ellis & P. Watson, EU-anti-discrimination Law (2nd edition), Oxford University Press:
Oxford 2012.
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if a certain treatment which is on its face neutral has a disparate impact on a
group protected by the discrimination ground.
In respect of direct discrimination, the Directive provides for very few excep-
tions. The most relevant regards the existence of a so called ‘genuine and deter-
mining occupational requirement’, which was central to the preliminary question
of the French court in Bougnaoui.60 This exception means that a difference of
treatment which is based on a characteristic related to religion or belief ‘shall
not constitute discrimination where, by reason of the nature of the particular
occupational activities concerned or of the context in which they are carried out,
such a characteristic constitutes a genuine and determining occupational re-
quirement, provided that the objective is legitimate and the requirement is
proportionate’ (article 4 (1)). The wording of this exception clause closely follows
very similar provisions in the directives regarding discrimination on grounds
of sex and race.61 In the latter context an example of what was envisaged to be
covered by this exception concerns the hiring of actors or actresses. Though
refusing a black or female candidate for the role of John F. Kennedy constitutes
a difference in treatment directly based on race or sex, such differential treatment
is justified because specific racial characteristics and a specific sex are essential
features of this historical person.
As far as indirect discrimination may be at stake the Directive allows for a
general justification clause. Where an apparently neutral provision, criterion
or practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons this does not violate the directive if
it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that
aim are appropriate and necessary (article 2(2)(b)). This implies a proportionality
test.
4.2. Direct and indirect discrimination
A dress code prohibiting wearing religious clothing or symbols
may fall under the scope of the concept of either direct or indirect discrimination
depending on the way in which it is formulated and embedded. If religious ex-
Directive 2000/78 also contains a very broadly formulated possibility for justifying differential
treatment on any of the grounds covered in article 2(5): ‘This Directive shall be without prejudice
60
to measures laid down by national law which, in a democratic society, are necessary for public
security, for the maintenance of public order and the prevention of criminal offences, for the
protection of health and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. As the CJEU
did not address this exception clause at all I will not explore this further here either.
Article 14(2) Directive 2006/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 5 July
2006 on the implementation of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of
61
men and women in matters of employment and occupation (recast), OJ L 204/23; Article 4
Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 on the implementation of equal treatment
irrespective of race or ethnic origin in employment and regarding access to and supply of goods
and services (Race directive), OJ L 180/22.
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pressions as such are targeted this would come under the notion of direct dis-
crimination, but if the prohibition is part of a more general rule also including
the banning of other expressions of personal identity, such as political and
philosophical ones, it would come in the purview of indirect discrimination.
The ruling of the CJEU is most clear where it explains how a prohibition
instituted by a private employer to wear a headscarf at work which is directly
based on religion should be dealt with.62 This is the central issue addressed in
Bougnaoui, the case in which the ban on the wearing of a headscarf was instituted
after a complaint by a customer. The Court concludes that the exception clause
regarding the existence of a ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’
is not applicable. This provision can only be successfully invoked in very limited
circumstances and refers to requirements that are objectively demanded by the
nature of the activities concerned or by the context in which these are carried
out. Subjective considerations, such as the employer’s wish to comply with his
customer’s preferences, do not meet this standard.63 This seems a convincing
reasoning, as it appears hard to argue that the wearing of a headscarf interferes
with the professional performance of Bougnaoui as an IT-engineer. Nevertheless,
while the Court’s reasoning ties in with the position taken by AG Sharpston
that the derogation laid down in article 4(1) only applies ‘in the most limited of
circumstances’, it differs from AG Kokott, who considered the provision to be
applicable by giving a much broader interpretation of the scope of article 4(1).64
As a prohibition on wearing religious clothing or symbols will often be
embedded in a broader dress code or policy (or can easily be made part of such
a broader framework to avoid allegations of direct discrimination on a prohibited
ground) the Court’s considerations regarding the assessment of indirect dis-
crimination are much more important and relevant than its holdings regarding
direct discrimination. This matter was addressed in the case Achbita, in which
the internal company rule was directed at prohibiting visible religious as well
as political and philosophical expressions to achieve a neutral appearance to-
wards customers.65 Given this importance, it is all the more disappointing that
the reasoning and conclusions of the CJEU how to assess whether indirect
discrimination is at stake are ambiguous and unclear. The lack of clarity regards
In neither of the cases does the Court pronounce itself on the question whether direct or indirect
discrimination is actually at stake, leaving it to the national court to assess this on the basis of
the specific facts of each case.
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Bougnaoui, supra note 3, para. 40.63
Opinion Sharpston, supra note 6, para. 101; Opinion Kokott, supra note 6, para. 77-84.64
This is not to say that the dismissal of Achbita could not be viewed as direct discrimination
after all, as the distinction between direct and indirect discrimination is not always as clear as
65
it would seem. See e.g. Saïla Ouald-Chaib and Valeska David, European Court of Justice keeps
the door to religious discrimination in the private workplace opened. The European Court of Human
Rights could close it, 27 March 2017 https://strasbourgobservers.com/2017/03/27/european-
court-of-justice-keeps-the-door-to-religious-discrimination-in-the-private-workplace-opened-
the-european-court-of-human-rights-could-close-it/#more-3549.
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both elements of the test to be applied in cases of potential indirect discrimina-
tion: whether a legitimate aim is present and whether the means chosen are
appropriate and necessary to achieve that aim.
4.3. Legitimate aim
The Court accepts the wish of the company G4S to show a
religiously, politically and philosophically neutral image towards its customers
as a legitimate goal to pursue. The Court points to the freedom to conduct a
business, which has been included as a fundamental freedom in article 16 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Though this seems a convincing foundation,
when taking a closer look this foundation turns out to be rather shaky. To start
with, article 16 of the Charter is formulated in a way that is far from absolute.
In fact, what is given with one hand seems to be taken back by the other where
the recognition of the freedom to conduct a business is conditional on both EU
and national law and practices.66 This means both EU law and national law can
limit the freedom to conduct a business and this is exactly what anti-discrimi-
nation law is all about. EU Directive 2000/78 seeks to limit the freedom of
employers to conduct their business or organization as they see fit to protect
workers against discrimination by their employer.
This being the case, invoking the freedom to conduct a business to justify
potential discrimination cannot be determining. Instead of such reasoning the
Court should have looked beyond the ‘freedom to conduct a business’ to
identify which interest the employer could put forward to justify its policy of
neutrality. In particular where a private business is concerned it does not seem
very easy to identify a legitimate interest of the employer.67 Contrary to a public
sector employer, a private enterprise cannot invoke the principle of state neu-
trality. Though as has been explained above, it is up for discussion whether this
principle is best served by a policy of banning or accommodating religious ex-
pressions in the public sphere, there is no doubt that the principle of state
neutrality as such constitutes an important constitutional value of liberal
democratic states. But what value or interest could legitimately be underlying
a private firm’s neutral appearance policy? In this respect it is quite telling that
Article 16 reads: ‘The freedom to conduct a business in accordance with Union law and national
laws and practices is recognised’.
66
See for a discussion on this point also the EuropeanLawBlog by G. Davies, Achbita v. G4S:
religious equality squeezed between profit and prejudice, 6 April 2017, http://european-
67
lawblog.eu/2017/04/06/achbita-v-g4s-religious-equality-squeezed-between-profit-and-prejudice/
and M. Bell, Leaving religion at the door? The European Court of Justice and religios symbols
in the workplace, Human Rights Law Review 2017, 0, p. 1-13.
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France apparently did not support the position of G4S in the case Achbita and
considered the dress code banning religious clothing and symbols not justified.68
Economic interests would seem to be a more relevant reason for an employer
to make his company appear neutral to the outside world. In the current
European context characterized by social tensions surrounding Islam it is not
unfeasible to imagine that an employer may want to avoid the risk of incurring
negative economic consequences from customers who respond negatively to
expressions of Islamic belief, as happened in the case of Bouganoui. In its ruling
the Court clearly stated that such subjective feelings cannot be a legitimate
reason for a headscarf ban. If this is the case more general neutrality policies
which pro-actively play into similar attitudes would seem equally unacceptable.
4.4. Proportionality of the neutrality rules
The most important part of the CJEU’s rulings – which is also
the most unclear and ambiguous part – regards the guidance the Court formu-
lates in the context of the proportionality test to help the domestic court apply
Directive 2000/78 to the cases at hand at the national level.
The Court does not give a clear answer to the crucial question about how
much room EU law leaves to the national authorities to decide for themselves
how to regulate the wearing of religious clothing or symbols in employment.
Does the Court interpret EU law as requiring uniform standards in this area
or does it – in line with the ECtHR – accept the widely diverging practices at
the domestic level by granting the national courts ample discretion to decide
whether prohibitions on the wearing of religious clothing or symbols are com-
patible with Directive 2000/78? Or does it perhaps regard some uniformity
necessary under EU law, but is it not agreed on the level of protection to be
guaranteed in this way? The ruling in Achbita does not give a clear and unam-
biguous answer to these questions as it can be read in quite different ways.
On the one hand, the Court seems to formulate uniform standards where
it points out two concrete conditions that have to be met to make a neutrality
rule prohibiting wearing any sign of political, religious or philosophical convic-
tion proportional. Firstly, such a policy needs to be limited to workers who ac-
tually interact with customers.69 Secondly, the employer should offer the em-
ployee a post not involving any visual contact with customers instead of dismiss-
ing him or her, if this can be achieved ‘taking into account the inherent con-
France’s position in this respect is mentioned by Kokott in her opinion, see supra note 6, para.
63.
68
Achbita, supra note 3, para. 42.69
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straints to which the undertaking is subject’ and without the employer ‘being
required to take on an additional burden’.70
Both conditions are not very strict. Though the first condition limits the
number of employees that will be affected, it still leaves a very large group of
workers exposed to the negative effects of a ban on wearing religious clothing
or symbols. The second condition seems to have no real bite at all as moving a
worker to another job will probably almost always entail some ‘additional burden’
for the employer. The Court’s weak formulation of the obligation of the employer
to accommodate the religious needs of his workers is striking if it is compared
to the way in which the obligations of an employer to accommodate the needs
of disabled workers are formulated. In the latter case the employer is bound to
provide reasonable accommodation unless this creates a ‘disproportionate bur-
den’.71
Apart from these two conditions the Court does not provide the national
court with any other guidance how to apply the proportionality test. It remains
silent regarding various important if not crucial considerations that were raised
in the opinions of the advocates general in the cases of Achbita and Bougnaoui.
To give several examples: both Kokott and Sharpston address the question
whether more room exists for a difference in treatment on the grounds of reli-
gion than for differential treatment on grounds of sex or race, because religion
or belief, unlike sex or race, is not an immutable characteristic. Though both
have diverging views on this issue, the Court does not pay any attention to it
and does not indicate which of the approaches is the proper one under EU law.72
Another example regards the potential intersection between discrimination
on grounds of religion and on grounds of sex or race/ethnic origin where a
prohibition to wear a headscarf is at stake. In the Belgian and French social
context persons who are predominantly affected by such a prohibition arguably
belong to minority groups of non-western (often North-African) descent and
are predominantly female. If such intersection with race/ethnic origin and sex
is considered to be present, this may well warrant a very strict test indeed as
differences in treatment based on sex or race are very difficult to justify. As
Kokott points out, if a ban would also put employees of a particular sex, colour
or ethnic background at a particular disadvantage this might indicate that that
ban is disproportionate.73 Though Kokott concludes such intersection does not
Achbita, supra note 3, para. 43. A third condition which the Court formulates I leave aside here
as it seems self-evident indeed: the employer’s policy must be pursued in a consistent and
systematic manner, see CJEU Achbita, supra note 3, para. 40.
70
Article 5 Directive 2000/78; emphasis added.71
Opinion Kokott, supra note 6, para. 116; Opinion Sharpston, supra note 6, para. 118.72
Opinion Kokott, supra note 6, para. 121.73
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exist – a conclusion that is up for discussion – the Court does not even address
this point.74
A final example of important issues completely ignored by the Court regards
article 4(2) of the Treaty of European Union (TEU). This provision requires the
Union to respect the national identity of the member states. Advocate General
Kokott emphasizes the importance of this obligation as a guiding principle to
assess the legitimacy of a headscarf ban such as at stake in Achbita. According
to her it requires that the application of the Directive must not adversely affect
that national identity. As such article 4(2) is to be taken into account when in-
terpreting the principle of equal treatment and assessing the justification for
any differences in treatment.75 To her mind article 4(2) TEU would also seem
to imply there is no need for a uniform standard across the member states.76
Instead of addressing the issues mentioned, in addition to formulating the
two conditions the Court gives a very general direction to the national court:
‘It is for the referring court, having regard to all the material in the file, to take
into account the interests involved in the case and to limit the restrictions on
the freedoms concerned to what is strictly necessary’.77
This broad and general wording seems to put the two concrete conditions
that have to be met to legitimately introduce a head scarf ban in a new perspec-
tive. It suggests that, after all, the Court leaves the ultimate balancing of interests
at stake to the national courts and requires them to ensure that limitations on
the freedoms involved do not go any further than ‘strictly necessary’. All this
suggests a stricter test than is encapsulated in the two conditions formulated
by the Court. If correct, the two conditions should be interpreted as minimum
conditions only, that is conditions that have to be met as a minimum if the
national court would hold that – everything considered – a headscarf ban would
be legitimate. From the perspective of the protection of the individual rights
and freedoms of workers one would hope this is the right interpretation of the
rulings, but regretfully the Court is not at all clear whether this is indeed what
it means to say.
For the intersection between race, sex and religion in regulations banning headscarves see e.g.
L. Roseberry, Religion, ethnicity and gender in the Danish headscarf debate in: D. Schiek &
74
V. Chege (eds), European Union non-discrimination law. Comparative perspectives on multidimen-
sional equality law, Routledge-Cavendish: London/New York 2009, p. 329-351 ; T. Loenen, The
headscarf debate: approaching the intersection of sex, religion and race under the ECHR and
EC equality law, in: D. Schiek & V. Chege (eds), European Union non-discrimination law.
Comparative perspectives on multidimensional equality law, Routledge-Cavendish: London/New
York 2009, p. 313-328.
Opinion Kokott, supra note 6, para. 32.75
Opinion Kokott, supra note 6, para. 125. See for further discussion of art. 4(2) section 5.76
Achbita, supra note 3, para. 43.77
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To conclude, the rulings allow for quite different interpretations. On the
one hand, an interpretation is possible which reads the decisions as allowing
a headscarf ban under the condition of being embedded in a more general,
consistently applied policy and being limited to employees who are in direct
and visible contact with customers. In addition, the condition applies that an
employer cannot dismiss a worker for not abiding by the rules if he can transfer
the employee to a different position without additional burden. As mentioned
in the introduction, this interpretation seems to have been prominent in the
first reactions to the rulings in the media. On the other hand, an interpretation
is possible which reads the conditions mentioned as minimum requirements
only, leaving a fuller and strict assessment of the headscarf ban to the national
level.
Whatever the right interpretation, the lack of clarity left by the Court’s rulings
leave ample room for further elaboration of the legal framework to be applied
in future cases that will no doubt reach the Court at some point. Against this
setting it is important to discuss which direction the Court could take and which
reasons could inform the choices to be made.
5. Where to go from Achbita and Bougnaoui?
Reflecting on the way ahead, I would suggest the most impor-
tant considerations for the Court would regard a) the conformity of its approach
with the ECHR, b) the need to strike a balance between uniformity and diversity
and c) the ambition to further develop the social and human rights focus of the
EU in tandem with its economic goals.78
Conformity of the CJEU approach to the issue of wearing religious clothing
or symbols at work with the human rights protection offered under the ECHR
is a first important consideration. Even if the EU so far has not acceded to the
ECHR and is not directly bound by its provisions, the ECHR has been given a
priority position in EU law by article 6(3) TEU which provides that fundamental
rights as guaranteed by the Convention constitute general principles of Union
law. In addition, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights gives a priority status
to the ECHR where it provides that the meaning and scope of rights correspond-
ing with rights in the ECHR ‘shall be the same’ as those in the latter Conven-
tion.79
For some additional considerations see M.L.P. Loenen & L. Vickers, More is less? Multiple
protection of human rights in Europe and the risks of erosion of human rights standards, in:
78
S. Morano-Foadi & L. Vickers (eds), Fundamental rights in the EU. A matter for two courts, Hart
Publishing: Oxford/Portland 2015, p. 159-177.
Article 52 (4): ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed
by the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the
79
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention.
This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’
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As the overview of the case law of the ECtHR in section 3 shows, the national
authorities have a wide margin of appreciation to regulate wearing religious
clothing and other symbols. There is no doubt this wide margin is applicable
in the public sphere and though the case law regarding the private sphere is
limited, the Eweida case does not really suggest a different approach as I argued
above.
A wide margin of appreciation means that the ECtHR accepts the widely
diverging practices existing in European countries, as is exemplified by the ap-
proaches in France, the UK and the Netherlands. This being the case, it would
seem the EU also has ample room for maneuver in this area, as the broad
margin of appreciation would logically also apply to EU standard setting even
if the EU as yet is not directly bound by the ECHR. This ample room for setting
additional EU standards in this area also fits in with the ECtHR’s Bosphorus
doctrine.80 From the perspective of conformity with the ECHR then, it seems
the CJEU could leave the regulation of wearing religious clothing or symbols
in employment largely to the national level – just as the ECtHR seems to do –
or set more uniform standards for the member states.
Perhaps the most important and difficult consideration to inform the CJEU
about the direction to take concerns the proper balance to be struck between
uniformity and diversity. The particular difficulty here lies in several factors.
From a legal perspective, the Court is bound to uphold the efficacy and unifor-
mity of EU law across member states. As far as EU non-discrimination law is
concerned, its effectiveness would be greatly hampered if the CJEU allows the
transposition of the EU equality directives to result in different standards of
protection against discrimination on grounds of religion in different member
states.
At the same, and as emphasised by advocate general Kokott, the CJEU is
under an obligation to respect the national identity of the member states as
guaranteed in article 4(2) of the TEU:
‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as
well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures,
political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government.’
In the Bosphorus case the ECtHR clarified how to understand the relationship between the
ECHR, EU law and the responsibilities of the States Parties in respect of both. The Court starts
80
from the presumption that the protection offered by the EU is ‘equivalent’ to the protection
offered by the ECHR and that no conflict with the Convention exists unless ‘in the circumstances
of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of the Convention rights was manifestly
deficient’. ECtHR 30 June 2005, Bosphorus v. Ireland, appl.no. 45036/98, section 156. More
recently the doctrine has been elaborated further in the grand Chamber judgment ECtHR 23
May 2016, Avotiņš v. Latvia, appl.no. 17502/07. See for a discussion of this S. Johansen, ‘EU
law and the ECHR: the Bosphorus presumption is still alive and kicking – the case of Avotiņš
v. Latvia’, 24 May 2016, http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2016/05/eu-law-and-echr-bosphorus-
presumption.html (last accessed 2 November).
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There can be little doubt that the relationship between state and religion
and the way in which religious manifestations are regulated are closely tied to
national history and culture. There can also be hardly any doubt that such ar-
rangements are usually part of states’ constitutional structures and can be per-
ceived to belong to national identity as referred to in article 4(2) TEU. The latter
may also explain why judgments by international courts regarding this issue
are so very sensitive and attract so much media attention. From this perspective
it may be wise for the CJEU to leave the regulation of religious clothing and
symbols largely to the member states and not to interfere with the decision
making in this respect by democratically better placed bodies at the national
level.
At the same time, the CJEU may consider it relevant that the lack of common
ground across the EU member states regarding the regulation of religious ex-
pressions at work is significantly less stark in the private sphere than it is in
the public sphere and – if we can take France as a yardstick – not constitutionally
embedded. As such it would be rather far-fetched to characterize neutrality
policies by employers in the private sector as part of the constitutional traditions
of member states. This would suggest that developing more uniform and strict
standards regarding private sector employment would not engage article 4(2)
TEU.
A third consideration for the CJEU to take into account concerns the EU
commitment to improve the protection of fundamental rights across the Union
to which the adoption of the Charter of Fundamental Rights as a legally binding
part of EU law testifies. Directive 2000/78 is also a clear manifestation of this
more social and human rights face of the EU and its ambitions. To live up to
this commitment one would expect the CJEU to strive as a matter of general
principle for a high level of protection of rights and freedoms of workers, inclu-
ding their religious freedom. Allowing the member states to severely limit this
freedom in the workplace does not seem to sit easily with this ambition. At the
same time, article 51 (3) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights expressly
provides for the possibility of EU law giving more extensive protection than the
ECHR.
In particular, where prohibitions on wearing religious clothing and symbols
are at stake, economic and social considerations could be of additional concern.
The workers most affected by such prohibitions belong to groups that are most
in need of economic and social integration: persons – and in particular women –
from ethnic minority groups for whom employment is generally perceived as
crucial for integration into society. In addition, condoning much lower protection
of religious freedom in the workplace in some countries than in others may
well negatively affect the free movement of workers within the EU and thus
compromise one of the Union’s foundational freedoms.
Given the above considerations, a middle ground that the court could take
is to set strict and uniform standards in the private sphere and to leave more
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room for diversity in the public sphere. Being strict in the private sector would
require the Court to be critical of the reasons that can be put forward by a private
employer to prohibit wearing religious clothing or symbols at work, in particular
if the goal is formulated as a policy of neutrality. In addition, the Court should
then strictly review the proportionality of a ban on wearing of religious clothing
or symbols to achieve such neutrality. In both respects the Court could be in-
spired by the approaches in the UK and in the Netherlands.
Being more lenient and leaving more room for diversity in the public sector
would tie in with what are undeniably widely diverging and constitutionally
embedded approaches to state neutrality. At the same time, even if the Court
leaves much leeway to the member states in the public sphere it could require
them to limit the scope of prohibitions to wear religious clothing or symbols
to where this is strictly necessary. Thus, for instance, it could also apply the two
conditions for a ban on religious clothing or symbols as formulated in Achbita
to the public sector. Limiting the applicability of a ban to those in face-to-face
contact with the general public and providing for alternative positions for those
who cannot abide with the neutrality requirement for religious reasons would
significantly reduce the number of people affected by a ban without disrespecting
the choice for and core purpose of a strict, exclusive state neutrality principle.
6. Concluding remarks
The above analysis and reflections intended to show that the
CJEU rulings in Achbita and Bougnaoui do not provide clear guidance for the
member states on how to deal with the issue of wearing religious clothing or
symbols in employment. In fact, they are extremely brief, minimally motivated
and ambiguous. An explanation for this could well be that the Court itself was
seriously divided internally on the proper interpretation of the applicable EU
law, just as the advocates general who advised the Court in those cases. Where
the judgments allow for different interpretations, from the perspective of the
fundamental rights of workers the better one would be the interpretation which
provides them with more protection of their religious freedom. At the same
time, considerations of respecting diversity would seem to call for allowing the
member states more leeway to regulate the issue at stake where other important
values and interests are involved, such as constitutionally embedded, specific
conceptions of state neutrality. As the latter does not seem to be at issue in the
private sector this would suggest that where a private employment relationship
is concerned the Court should give priority to the freedom of religion of workers
by developing strict and more uniform standards. The UK and the Netherlands
provide good examples. This would tie in with the fact that regarding private
employment approaches in the member states diverge much less than those
regarding the public sector. Anyway, given their terseness and ambiguity, the
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rulings seem to leave the Court with ample room for developing its case law in
various directions. We will have to wait and see how things will turn out.
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